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Three Essays on the Effect of Alternative Ownership Structures on 
Investment and Financial Constraints: An Empirical Investigation 
 
This dissertation consists of three separate papers examining the relationship between investment, 
financial constraints and ownership structures.  
 
In the first paper new and rich panel data for a large and representative sample of firms are used to 
estimate the sensitivity of access to capital to differing ownership structures. The investment behaviour 
of firms is examined in a dynamic setting in the presence of adjustment costs, liquidity constraints and 
imperfect competition. The empirical work is based on the derivation of Euler equations in the presence 
of symmetric and quadratic adjustment costs and both debt and equity constraints. Whereas the norm is 
to use ad hoc approaches to model these constraints, our alternative and more consistent approach leads 
to the inclusion of financial variables in the investment equation in first differences rather than in 
levels. The GMM estimates confirm the importance of financial factors in determining investment rates 
and suggest that firms owned by insiders, especially non-managerial employees, are more prone to be 
liquidity constrained than are others. Among the other groups, somewhat surprisingly, only domestic 
outsider owned firms display sensitivity to both measures of the availability of finance, with manager 
owned firms being sensitive to the availability of external finance, while state owned firms being 
sensitive to the availability of internal finance. 
 
In the second paper we use a switching regression framework when sample separation is unknown and 
endogenous and firms are assumed to operate either in the financially constrained or in the financially 
unconstrained regime. The actual regime the firm is in is determined by a switching or selection 
function, which depends on those variables that theoretically determine the wedge between internal and 
external finance, the severity of information and agency problems and time-varying firm 
characteristics. Among main findings are: (i) separate regimes exist in investment behavior; (ii) the 
likelihood of being financially constrained is higher in firms that are recently privatized, small and 
where ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders and the state; (iii) soft budget constraints 
lower the probability of a firm being financially constrained; (iv) the actual probabilities of operating in 
the financially constrained regime are calculated to be quite high and essentially stable (v) ownership 
structure affects investment beyond its indirect effects through financial constraints.  
 
Finally, in the third paper the credit-rationing hypothesis in privately held firms is investigated using an 
error correction specification. The System GMM estimates confirm the importance of financial factors 
in determining investment rates and suggest that firms owned by insiders, especially non-managerial 
employees, are more prone to be liquidity constrained than are others. 
 
